



Wittgenstein as unreliable narrator / unreliable author 
 
   By Rupert Read. 
 
 
“I ought to be no more than a mirror, in which my reader can see his own thinking with all 
its deformities so that, helped in this way, he can put it right.” (Wittgenstein C&V, pp. 17-




In Wittgenstein, philosophy comes to know itself. Throughout his career, and especially in 
his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein was 
profoundly concerned with what we can loosely term 1 the ‘conditions of possibility’ of what 
philosophers sought to do - and (thus) of his own writing. 
 Examining in particular the famous section 133 of the Investigations, I will seek to 
elucidate Wittgenstein’s extraordinary writing-stratagem. His writing has often been 
criticised as ‘obscure’ - this evinces a fundamental failure to understand the way 
Wittgenstein writes, especially in those works where he laboured for years over how to 
present them. In his two masterworks, Wittgenstein operates as, in broadly Modernist 
terms, an unreliable narrator or rather perhaps what William Golding (in The Hot Gates) 
calls an “unreliable author”. (I will briefly offer some cases from the cinema, to illustrate 
                                                 
1 Only loosely, because too literal an understanding of this phrase would be likely to pitch us into thinking that 




further the potentially ‘therapeutic’ (or, better ‘liberatory’) nature of such unreliability: 
Memento, Persona, and Fight Club.) 
 Wittgenstein seems to offer a theory to end all philosophical theories, in his early 
work. In his later work, he seems to offer a discovery to end all philosophical discoveries. 
Both appearances are subtly, deliberately, seriously delusive. And necessarily so: any 
strategem that does not involve such ‘indirection’ will tend to fall back into the very thing it 
criticises. If one wants to make it possible for philosophy to be written at all, after Kant and 
Frege, one needs to avoid hoisting oneself on one’s own petard: but “…to end all…” -style 
thinking endlessly self-hoists (as is patent in the fate of the Logical Positivists, for instance, 
who failed to understand Wittgenstein’s stratagem). 
 I examine the well-known invocation of therapies and the discussion of ‘the real 
discovery’ - the one that allegedly enables one to stop philosophising - in 133. The 
translation of 133 is pondered, and a reading proposed wherein this passage certainly 
does not amount to any crude ‘end of philosophy’ thesis, and is rather profoundly 
manifestatative of the kind of aspect to Wittgenstein’s writing that Cavell has taught: i.e. 
133 too turns out not to be a ‘statement’ of Wittgenstein’s ‘position’, but a set of 
temptations that need careful work by one for one to avoid entrapment by. 
 Wittgenstein writes as he does not out of a faddish desire to make it new, but out of 
a profound need to plough over the field of language. His aim is to get the reader to do the 
kind of work that he himself was painfully doing: to seek to free oneself from the endless 
pull of philosophical delusion and premature self-satisfaction. 
 
 
Introduction: A philosophy of self-reflection and literary experimentation 
There is no philosopher more self-aware than Wittgenstein. He takes inspiration from 
the Delphic-Socratic injunction, “Know thyself”, and his philosophy can be well understood 
 
 
as an endeavour to see philosophy as self-knowledge, and as knowledge of one’s 
philosophical interlocutor.2 His Philosophical Investigations opens by paying homage to 
Augustine, whose work Wittgenstein greatly admired, and the book can be well read as a 
‘confession’ of long engagements with what turns out to be a latent desire to speak 
nonsense, on Wittgenstein’s part. Wittgenstein was always first and foremost concerned to 
think the method(s) of what he was doing (and to ponder how to enable others to understand 
it). 
In this way, we might see Wittgenstein as a Modernist thinker. 
Now, in other ways, Wittgenstein was profoundly anti-Modernist. Most notably, 
perhaps, in his abyssal critique of the narrative of ‘progress’. (I have addressed this crucial 
and brilliant aspect of Wittgenstein’s thought elsewhere,3 and will not dwell on it here.)  But 
in his conception of philosophy itself, and in his highly innovative literary mode(s), a genuine 
affinity can be discerned with the Modernism that was going on around Wittgenstein in his 
lifetime. It is this that is my primary concern in the present essay. 
Wittgenstein’s writing strategem is highly unusual. In one way it is incredibly simple 
and direct; in another, ‘indirect’ and peculiar. He seeks truthfully to tell of his own struggles 
to attain clarity. He expresses this by way principally of dialogues with others and with 
himself: “Nearly all of my writings are private conversations with myself. Things that I say to 
myself tête-à-tête.”, he said, in 1948 (C&V, p. 77. Source: MS 137, p. 134. 26 December, 
1948). By means of doing so, he hopes to engage the reader in the undertaking of a similar 
set of self-reflective and dialogical processes. 
                                                 
2 See James Conant’s work on Kierkegaard on Wittgenstein, and his and Diamond’s writings on the task laid down by 
Wittgenstein in the Tractatus - that of understanding him, not his book (for: there is no such thing as literally 
understanding his book; for , ‘understood’ aright, it is einfach Unsinn). See also the later Baker’s book Wittgenstein’s 
method: neglected aspects (henceforth BWM). 





Wittgenstein’s writing, because of its highly unusual forms and organisation, is often 
claimed to be obscure. Many philosophers, including many of Wittgenstein’s supposed 
followers, ‘improve’ it, extract ‘theses’ from it, and so forth. 
This seems to me a failure. A failure to appreciate the reasons why Wittgenstein wrote 
as he did. A failure to follow him. Or at least: if these philosophers are right, then Wittgenstein 
was a failure. He wrote obscurely and ineffaciously. I prefer to take seriously the possibility 
that there were (good) reasons that Wittgenstein wrote as he did. The reasons already 
indicated above: that it was honest; that it could help a reader to avoid being taken in by the 
sometime-appearance of philosophy as the production of generalisations as if it were a sort 
of ‘super-science’ or of essentialisations as if it were ‘meta-physics’; that, in short, it guarded 
against insufficiently reflective philosophy. 
In what follows, I will home in on one moment in Wittgenstein’s writing, Philosophical 
Investigations section 133. A famous moment, in which he appears to entertain the drastic 
idea of ending philosophy altogether. I shall maintain instead that the wording of 133 
deliberately embodied a ‘final’ temptation: the fantasy of the ending of philosophy via one 
discovery. And that it helps one to work through that temptation, to a sounder idea of the 
nature of philosophy, as Wittgenstein practiced it. 
 
 
An ‘object of comparison’: namely, objects of comparison 
Let us look very briefly at the remarks that precede PI 133, which introduce a new 
concept in philosophical method: that of ‘objects of comparison’: 
 
  130. Our clear and simple language-games are not preliminary studies 
for a future regimentation of language -- as it were, first approximations, 
ignoring friction and air resistance. Rather, the language-games 
 
 
stand there as objects of comparison which, through similarities 
and dissimilarities, are meant to throw light on features of our language. 
  131. For we can avoid unfairness or vacuity in our assertions only 
by presenting the model as what it is, as an object of comparison -- as 
a sort of yardstick; not as a preconception to which reality must 
correspond.  
 
 With an object of comparison, one gains from the dialectic back and forth between 
the object and what one is comparing with it, what one is seeing via it, both in terms of 
dissimiliarities and similarities. (I have shown how this works at length elsewhere, for 
instance in the Wittgensteinian work on the film Memento that Phil Hutchinson and I 
published in Film as philosophy: essays on cinema after Wittgenstein and Cavell. 
Protagonists / characters in philosophical films often function precisely as something like 
objects of comparison; one’s journey of identification and disidentification with them is 
frequently a crucial part of the transformative work that such films undertake or facilitatively 
make available to the (serious) viewer.4 We will recur to the example of films-as-philosophic 
‘objects of comparison’ at greater length, including Memento, later in this chapter.) 
 In thinking through the object of comparison before one, one is, for Wittgenstein, 
encouraged constantly to be aware that one will likely exaggerate similarities at the expense 
of differences. Thus, as a corrective, one ought if anything to emphasize the differences 
over the similarities. This is a key way in which the ‘object of comparison’ object of 
comparison focuses our activity more healthily and effectively than the ‘model’ object of 
comparison (or certainly than the ‘model’ model); it underscores the profound difference 
between the scientific sensibility and ‘our’ (Wittgensteinian) philosophical sensibility. For 
                                                 




modelling is focused primarily on the similarities, typically ignoring the dissimilarities (just in 
the way that Wittgenstein draws attention to in 130). 
 As Wittgenstein says in 131, we will be “unfair” if we fall away from the seeking after 
‘objects of comparison’ into a seeking after ‘models’ in the usual sense of that word.5  One 
will fail to be fair – to the phenomena; and in particular (more literally) to those who one 
might be disagreeing with – one will fail to have integrity, fail to be doing the right thing, if 
one does not give dissimilarities their due just as much as similarities. And one will almost 
invariably incline – this is at the root of the deep attraction of scientism – toward over-
estimating the power of the similarities that inclined one in the first place toward the object 
of comparison one picked. As outlined in the Blue Book, pp.18-19, where Wittgenstein 
suggests that a main source for… “our craving for generality [is] our preoccupation with the 
method of science. I mean the method of reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to 
the smallest possible number of primitive natural laws; and, in mathematics, of unifying the 
treatment of different topics by using a generalization. Philosophers constantly see the 
method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer 
questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and 
leads the philosopher into complete darkness…” This is why we have above all to 
teach/learn/realise differences.6 Philosophy essentially involves seeking to be just to what it 
is that one is oneself wanting to say and succeeding in saying, when one successfully says 
things - and to be just to others in just the same way. 
          This objects of comparison of which Wittgenstein speaks are introduced with the 
purpose of seeking to make (particular? all?) philosophical problems (completely!) 
disappear. Or so, at least, Wittgenstein now goes on to (seem to?) suggest: 
                                                 
5 A kind of seeking which, incidentally, is in my view widespread – for instance, one finds it in Ricoeur’s influential 
hermeneutic ‘model’, (as) in his epochal article “The model of the text”.  
Note that Wittgenstein has already prepared the ground for the questioning of this ‘model’ model, in 120: “In giving 
explanations I already have to use the language full-blown (not some sort of preparatory, provisional one)…”. 






Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy? 
 In PI 133, Wittgenstein famously introduces 7 an object of comparison for 
philosophy itself: that of therapy. (Or rather: that of therapies. This is important: it reminds 
us that if we speak, as (following later Baker) I do, of “Wittgenstein’s method” or of “our 
method”, we must avoid being deluded into thinking that we are talking about one thing.) 
 Kelly Dean Jolley, a very acute reader of Wittgenstein, wrote an article some years 
ago offering a ‘close reading’ of section133 of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations 
(PI).8 His article performed some useful services. For instance, it highlighted the 
connection of para.109 with para.133, and the precise ambiguity of the former  (Is 
(ordinary) language what bewitches us or what enables us to escape bewitchment? 
Surely both). It also made a provocative and fairly compelling connection between 
Wittgenstein’s remark in 133 that “...series of examples can be broken off...” and his 
methodology particularly as declared in the Preface to PI (viz.: that his thoughts had to 
proceed from one to another with some breaks). Jolley’s reading amounts to an 
accenting in some detail of how to respond to the widespread, problematic claim that 
Wittgenstein is an ‘end-of-philosophy philosopher’ by means of re-interpreting the 
passage in the Investigations that most plausibly may be read so as to make that claim. 
 Nevertheless, I wish to contend that Jolley missed one part of the heart (‘the spirit’) 
of section 133, on what desire or hope we may reasonably have for philosophy, and thus 
that he missed a signal element of Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy throughout 
his life’s work, and failed to touch the heart of how 133 is not an end-of-philosophy 
proclamation. 
                                                 





 In explaining this, I want to follow upon the ground-breaking work of Cora Diamond 
and James Conant,9 writers who have most efficaciously shown how the Tractatus is 
best read as not as stating or exposing or even gesturing at profound, unutterable truths, 
but rather as engaging our temptation(s) to utter nonsense. But then what are we to 
make of the idea in 133 of “the discovery”, and apparently of an end to philosophy. Does 
this idea suggest that this discovery at least is not itself a temptation to nonsense, but a 
sensical revealing of such temptations?: 
 
    ...[T]he clarity that we are aiming at is certainly a complete clarity. But this just 
means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear. 
    The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of breaking off 
philosophising when I want to.--The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no 
longer tormented by questions which bring itself in question.--But now we 
demonstrate a method by examples, and the series of examples can be broken off.-
--Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a single Problem.  
 
Now, Jolley claims that “Wittgenstein ...seems to have had an idea of what it would be 
like to have reached philosophy’s end. Wittgenstein thought he could accomplish this feat 
simply by making what he called ‘the real philosophical discovery.’”  However, 
surprisingly, he leaves entirely open what “the real philosophical discovery” is or could 
possibly be, only claiming that “...Wittgenstein did not think he had made the real 
philosophical discovery.” (Jolley, pp.327-8)   But, not having been given an idea of what 
the content of such a discovery would be (as opposed to merely considering in the 
abstract its role in ‘ending philosophy’), why ought we think that (according to 
                                                 
9 See e.g. their articles in The New Wittgenstein. 
 
 
Wittgenstein) there is or could be any such thing, any more than there is one singular 
philosophical problem?  
The possibility opened up for us by Diamond, Cavell et al is that even here, at what 
others have called the close of the ‘chapter’ of PI on Philosophy, Wittgenstein is still 
dealing with a logical temptation. That is: is it at all clear that the implied author of PI is 
counselling us unreservedly to aim at complete clarity (and so forth)? Might it not be 
rather that one’s right aim can best -- or even only -- be realized by means of 
appreciating that a third way is possible, one that does not simply buy into the ‘correct’, 
‘conceptual clarificatory’ mode of proceeding; even as it sees clearly the mythicalistic 
errors of interlocutorial voices that would counsel scientism (or even counsel deliberate 
unclarity)? For, after all, most of the preceding 50 sections or more clearly engage 
critically such temptations both away from and toward clarity, logic. Why not here too? 
That is to say, if we can agree that the “sublimity” and non-vagueness of logic, the 
“hidden essence” of language, the ideal of “crystalline purity”; …if we can agree that 
these conceptions are not allowed to masquerade as well-formed by the implied author of 
PI, even when they seem absolutely to press themselves upon one, should we not be 
similarly willing to entertain the thought that the conceptions of “complete clarity”, of the 
complete disappearance of philosophical problems, of “the real discovery”, even of 
“[giving] philosophy peace”, may well themselves be similarly - thoroughly - problematic? 
As it were, the best that one can say for the content of Jolley’s 133 is then that “we 
should yield to the temptation to use this picture, but then investigate how the application 
of the picture goes” (PI para.374; and cf. para.424). 
 To argue thus is not to be committed to a totalistically dialogical/dialectical model of 
PI in the sense of holding that there are no moments that we can provisionally identify as 
being closer to Wittgenstein’s implied ‘view’ than any others. But this is only because, 
roughly speaking, the ‘correct’ voice would as it were be correct, would in all probability 
 
 
be Wittgenstein’s view, were that all there is to it, were we still able simply to engage in 
old-fashioned philosophical debate with more or less substantively and definitively 
misguided interlocutors  (We might, riffing on a well-known turn of phrase of Cavell’s, call 
this the “conditional correctness of the later Wittgenstein’s philosophical position”).  
The problem of course is, that once we have perhaps ‘grasped’ the nature of highly 
unconventional ‘Modernist’ method that Wittgenstein can best be read as essaying, then 
we go beyond this ‘correct’ view, too, and stop seeking for a philosophical position, of 
whatever kind. We must seek to understand ‘where we already are’: Cf. Wittgenstein, at 
p.10 of the revised edition of C&V: “I might say: if the place I want to get to could be only 
reached by way of a ladder, I would give up trying to get there. For the place I really have 
to get to is a place I must already be at now. // Anything I might reach by climbing a 
ladder does not interest me.” We seek to understand what is “in plain view” — while 
appreciating that even terms such as these (can easily) exert a problematic hold on us, 
and at best serve, ultimately, to point up their own perniciousness along with that of the 




 “The real [philosophical?] discovery”  
Let us back up a little. For it might be objected that there are conceivable candidates for 
the content of “the real philosophical discovery”, which Jolley could have considered had 
he been so minded. And surely there are: there are the kinds of discoveries made by 
Russell, Gödel, ‘the author of the Tractatus’. But these, Wittgenstein repudiated; 
according to the Diamondian reading (and it is mine too), the possibility of making 
fundamental philosophic discoveries was actually repudiated by Wittgenstein already in 
the Tractatus itself, by 6.53.   
 
 
 Perhaps “the real philosophical discovery” for Wittgenstein might be something like 
how everyday language actually is? No. Something like that might be one idea animating 
classical ‘Ordinary Language Philosophy’. But Wittgenstein steers carefully clear of such 
semi-sociolinguistics, throughout PI 1-133.  
And even if somehow one could be usefully said to discover something like this, in 
philosophy, this would still not amount to there being such a thing as “the [singular] real 
philosophical discovery”, only lots of little such ‘discoveries’. And, in this connection, we 
should note that it is the dissolution of various particular confusions and problems that 
Wittgenstein mentions with approval toward the close of para.133.10 
  Though even this, we should be very careful not to over-read. One of these little 
discoveries may work, for some people (at least one person),11 for a while. We shouldn’t 
bank on any more than that.12  
  Are there any candidates for “the real philosophical discovery” that Wittgenstein did 
not repudiate? Here is my central contention in a nutshell: that there is no indication in 
Wittgenstein’s oeuvre that he thought the notion of the “real discovery” mentioned in 133 
to be even sensical. 
 
 
 An objection? 
                                                 
10 Cf. here Z 447, which helps dissolve any remaining element of perplexity about PI 133, in this regard: “Disquiet in 
philosophy might be said to arise from looking at philosophy wrongly, seeing it wrong, namely as if it were divided into 
(infinite) longitudinal strips instead of into (finite) cross strips. …So we try as it were to grasp the unlimited strips and 
complain that it cannot be done piecemeal. To be sure it cannot, if by a piece one means an infinite longitudinal strip. 
But it may well be done, if one means a cross-strip. –But in that case we never get to the end of our work! –Of course 
not, for it has no end.” 
11 Cf. p.37 of BWM: “Both the claim that the order [emphasised in 132] is purpose-specific and the acknowledgement of 
he possibility of different orders indicate that [Wittgenstein’s] aim was to produce for each problem an order which 
would make it completely disappear, not to establish a single order which would make every problem disappear.” 
12 Compare p.213 of BWM: “[Wittgenstein] targets ‘philosophical problems, i.e. the particular disquiets of individuals 
which we call “philosophical problems” (von Wright 1982, Band XI, p.35). ’Our method’ is aimed at getting 
philosophical problems to disappear completely — in this sense of ‘problem’.’” 
 
 
An objection might be made at this point: that a reading of PI after the fashion of 
Diamond et al has not with completeness been given. This may be true. The work of 
Cavell, Diamond, Conant, Winch, Putnam, Minar, Guetti, Lugg, Hutchinson and my own 
work (and that of the later Baker; and of many more authors on PI who take these 
thinkers as their inspiration, in turn) is still in this sense ‘incomplete’. That is, an 
interpretation (of) the Investigations in earnest, in toto, from such an angle, has still not 
yet been accomplished  (Whereas e.g. (Baker-and-)Hacker have at least given a very 
complete reading of the ‘correct voice’ beating down its interlocutor(s) throughout PI. 
They take about as far as one can the project of demonstrating the philosophical 
correctness and virtuousity of ‘Wittgenstein’s position’; only, in the process, they 
necessarily make Wittgenstein sound sometimes much like any other philosopher with 
theses to support and an over-arching position to argue for. Thus, as Hutchinson and I 
have set out in some detail elsewhere,13 they fail to follow Wittgenstein.). The objection 
would then continue that, until such a reading has been given, we cannot know that the 
real philosophical discovery is not lurking somewhere in Wittgenstein’s text. 
 But such an objection is unreasonable, by Wittgensteinian lights. I have in mind the 
repeated reminder (in PI and On Certainty) that the theoretical possibility of a doubt is not 
a doubt. The same goes for a hope — or for a problem with a reading. (Compare also 
Wittgenstein’s thinking on the theoretical possibility of a hidden contradiction, in maths.)  
Just because there might conceivably be some way of reading 133, when a ‘complete’ 
reading of PI is allegedly available, which would amount to identifying ‘the real 
philosophical discovery’, is no reason to assume that such a discovery is in the offing. 
(This reply is especially so, given that a ‘complete’ ‘reading’ probably isn’t available even 
in principle… For Wittgenstein has no ‘position’.) 
                                                 




 Sure; there is more work to be done to form such an interpretation of (‘the later’) 
Wittgenstein; I am contributing a tiny piece of it here, even, and this book on Wittgenstein 
and modernism constitutes a little more of it. But what I hope already to have shown is 
this: that one of the passages in Wittgenstein’s work that might appear most strongly to 
resist the Diamond/Cavell manner of availing oneself of Wittgenstein’s philosophy can be 
read without difficulty as explicating or, better, exemplifying it. 133, I have suggested, 
continues dramatically the dialectic of temptation and correctness that characterises so 
much of the text of PI. There is nothing dogmatic about 133; it does not violate 
Wittgenstein’s cautions against a would-be philosophical finality, on my reading of it. 
  
 
 Philosophy bringing itself into question 
One problem that may remain is this. Consider this moment in 133 again: “The real 
discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy ... [t]he one 
that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring 
itself in question.” If “the real discovery” is something we desire but that we should not 
assume that we should (simply) desire, then, despite the importance of Wittgenstein’s 
remarks on the not-necessarily-problematic character of philosophising about philosophy 
(there being no need for a “second-order philosophy” (121)), there remains a sense in 
which Wittgenstein’s later work must run the same risks as the Tractatus evidently ran: 
philosophy will always periodically be bringing itself in question.  
 But perhaps that is unavoidable. For note a key way in which Jolley’s interpretation 
of 133 is dogmatic. Jolley speaks of “the real philosophical discovery”. But the word 
“philosophical” here is a leap, an unnecessary - unwarranted - insertion into 
Wittgenstein’s prose. Wittgenstein in fact speaks only of “the real discovery”. (And a 
moment’s reflection suggests a possible reason why: for if this discovery were 
 
 
philosophical, then, by virtue of itself, it arguably wouldn’t quite amount to an ending of 
philosophy! Philosophy would be continued, by virtue of the very ‘end of philosophy’ 
move…) 
 “The real discovery is the one that enables me to break off philosophizing when I 
want to.” This is palpably an image of liberation. One that takes one out of the sphere of 
philosophy. But we should be careful. We should be careful not to assume that such 
liberation is available in the way that we want it to be.14 (Remember what we teach 
children that “I want!” doesn’t get…)   
 Philosophy may be the subject that from time to time can’t help bringing itself into 
question. And a discovery that isn’t philosophical that could enable one to break off 
philosophising sounds desirable, and may well be possible sometimes. I think it is  (Such 
a discovery might be something like: being struck by the beauty of a person or a place, 
and finding peace in contemplation of them). But the (/our) method(s), its series of 
examples, don’t get broken off voluntaristically. Problems are solved/overcome when 
they are, if they are — and likely not forever. The price of philosophical freedom, on my 
understanding of Wittgenstein’s authorship, is vigilance whenever needful, including at 
times when one thinks one is no longer in need. Sometimes, especially at those times… 
   
 
 A healing philosophy, a philosophy of healing 
Let us return to where 133 then leaves us. The new Hacker-and-Schulte translation of the 
final sentence of 133 is helpful here:15 “There is not a single philosophical method, though 
                                                 
14 Contrast J. Genova’s reading of 133 (see http://philpapers.org/rec/JUDAMO ), which involves the almost-sophomoric 
exegesis of that paragraph as philosophically licensing one to stop philosophising when(ever) one pleases.  
15 Especially helpful, in that these two scholars are no friends of the ‘therapeutic’ interpretation of Wittgenstein. Thus 




there are indeed methods, different therapies, as it were.” This makes it clear that the 
comparison with therapies is non-accidental. These different methods of philosophy ARE 
— as it were — different therapies. That is what is being said here. In its full directness — 
and qualifiedness. The therapy/medicine16 object of comparison is worth taking seriously. 
Wittgenstein might have said: ’there are [different] methods [of philosophy], like 
different kinds of sport, or different ways of gardening”. Wittgenstein described himself as a 
disciple of Freud; I think it hard to imagine himself describing himself as (say) a disciple of 
Donald Bradman, or of some famous gardener.17  … Evidently, the therapy analogy is 
chosen because of the deep parallels that can be drawn, for our purposes, between 
philosophy and therapy/ies. That is why Wittgenstein described himself as “a disciple of 
Freud” (see the Introduction to Lectures and Conversations of Aesthetics, Psychology and 
Religious Belief); and in that connection we might find another way in which it is intelligible 
to regard Wittgenstein as a Modernist thinker.18 
 
 
Wittgenstein as unreliable author 
We have seen above an instance of how Wittgenstein’s writing works on one, and how 
one needs to find one’s own way through it. I would generalise, roughly, in the following 
manner, from this: In his two masterworks, Wittgenstein operates as, in broadly Modernist 
terms, an unreliable narrator — or rather perhaps what William Golding (in The Hot Gates) 
calls an “unreliable author”. Or even, in fact, both: for, as I shall briefly explain, 
                                                 
16 See PI 254-5. 
17 Perhaps “different martial arts” (suggested by Oskari Kuusela (personal communication)) would have been better; 
but, if so, then because it might actually have meant something significant for Wittgenstein to have compared his 
activity positively with that of Muhammed Ali, or Bruce Lee (though it is still hard to imagine him calling himself their 
‘disciple’). 
18 For more on this point, see my joint piece with Hutchinson on “Grammar”, in Matar (ed.) Understanding 




Wittgenstein is an ‘unreliable’ author who writes ‘unreliable’ voices, including even - 
specifically - an ‘unreliable’ narrator. 
 For Wittgenstein authorial strategy, as I have already indicated, is no accident, no 
‘obscurity’; it is a deliberate effort to seek to ensure that whatever the reader can do, one 
leaves to the reader.19 It has sometimes been called ‘therapeutic’ (including by me),20 and 
this is a useful object of comparison for it, as PI 130-3 indicate; better still, I now believe is 
the object of comparison of liberation: Wittgenstein fundamentally frees the reader (and 
himself) to find their own way, in philosophy. Wittgenstein ‘forces’ one to be free by 
imposing upon one a great discipline (this is no freedom of mere license of ‘anything goes, 
no post-modern relativism): the discipline of having to place oneself in (relation to) his 
dialogues. Having to work through the manifold of temptations that are set before one, 
including ‘ultimate’ temptations such as the fantasy of an outright end to philosophy. 
 If Wittgenstein were a ‘reliable’ author, then all this would be short-circuited. The 
reader would seek to operate with Philosophical Investigations as if it were a textbook;21 
only a very poorly written one. And that is of course how, from Pole and Strawson to 
Hacker and Horwich, PI is most often treated; an absurd fate for the masterwork of a 
world-historical philosopher. 
 Thus a useful object of comparison for Wittgenstein that we can draw from 
Modernism is precisely that of the unreliable author. One who creates further voices, that 
themselves are not reliable: even the ‘voice of correctness’, as I discuss above, should not 
be mistaken for Wittgenstein’s own. And even the ‘narratorial’ voice that Wittgenstein 
sometimes adds to that, especially in his ‘meta-philosophising’ (as in much of 133).22 
                                                 
19 “Whatever the reader can do too, leave to the reader.” (C&V, p. 77. Source: MS 137, p. 134. 27 December, 1948) 
20 See “Therapy”, co-authored with Phil Hutchinson, in Jolley (ed.), Wittgenstein: Key concepts. See also “A healing 
philosophy”, immediately above. 
21 See the Preface to the Tractatus. 
22 For a more general justification of the claim that even Wittgenstein’s ‘narrator’ is ‘unreliable’, and is not to be 
mistaken for Wittgenstein simpliciter, in propria persona, see my and Hutchinson’s discussion of David Stern’s 
interpretation, in our “Whose Wittgenstein?”. 
 
 
Rather, he is the totality of the voices; but simply to combine all the voices in which he 
speaks produces a hopeless mishmash, a tissue of contradictions. The only way that 
totality can be properly realized is in you. Wittgenstein’s ‘unreliability’ is the necessary 
condition for the reader’s autonomy. And such autonomy, that freedom, in a thoroughly 




Some filmic objects of comparison 
I now briefly offer some cases from the cinema, to illustrate further the potentially 
‘therapeutic’ (or, better ‘liberatory’) nature of such unreliability as outlined above: Persona, 
Fight Club, and Memento. 
For Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘object of comparison’ is, as I have already implied, a 
thoroughly promiscuous one, hardly a technical term  (This is itself part of Wittgenstein’s 
deliberately non-scientifical practice). One can think of ‘language-games’ as being objects 
of comparison; but equally, of ‘pictures’, of ‘perspicuous presentations’; or of Wittgenstein’s 
book as a whole. One can think of (various) characters in films as being objects of 
comparison (‘for example’: for oneself); or the films as a whole. 
Here are three cases, three films which offer some fruitful objects of comparison at 
various levels - for shedding light on Wittgenstein’s own practice. 
 
Bergman’s Persona is crucially changed, in one’s understanding of it, by thinking its 
final portion, in which one has to put into question what had seemed reliably narrated to one: 
that this was the story of two women and their encounter. By the end of the film, another 
possible reading is demanding attention: that, rather than being a story of the therapy of an 
actress at the hands of a nurse, this might instead be a story of the therapy of a nurse who 
 
 
has projected a persona of an actress. In other words, Persona can be viewed as a drama 
of integration, of coming to terms with one’s own tendency to alienate from oneself a part of 
oneself, and, in bad faith, to treat that part of oneself as another. 
 
Such a take on Persona might be supported by a close look at another film of 
unreliable narration, Fight Club. The two films superficially have little in common, but Fight 
Club serves as an extraordinarily revealing object of comparison for Persona; it reveals the 
possible reading of it that I just sketched; it develops that possibility. Fight Club is, it turns 
out, a drama of integration. The violence at its centre, like the violence at the centre of 
Persona, may well be a blind, or at most merely a route to the coming to terms with the 
violence one has been doing to oneself. It turns out in Fight Club that the narrator has 
created another persona which is a projection of all he wishes to be. We see that projection 
((as if) on a screen…); evoking the power of the (bad-faith) experience here. Thus the 
therapeutic journey to acknowledgement of reality, to self-knowledge, is as deep as it is 
dramatic.23 The protagonist’s re-integration into one self is the denouement of the film.  
 
Finally, consider the Nolans’ remarkable philosophical work, Memento.24 Here, there 
is a still more direct comparison with Wittgenstein available. The narrator of Memento, 
Leonard Shelby, whose memory has been damaged by a traumatic physical injury inflicted 
on him in an emotionally-traumatic event in which his wife was murdered, is a kind of 
philosophical detective into his own life. He confesses a kind of anti-Empiricist philosophy 
as he goes along, arguing that memory is unreliable. We experience reality with and through 
him - and come gradually to see that he is radically confused about his own life. I would 
argue that we also come to realise that this confusion might even be wilful on his part; for 
his own knowledge of his own memory-loss condition suggests a contradiction within that 
                                                 
23 Perhaps the culminatory scene of it is quoted here: http://www.quotes.net/mquote/31796  
24 For a full-length reading, see my and Hutchinson’s “Memento: A philosophical investigation”. 
 
 
condition, and suggests that it must be a condition that in some sense he is imposing on 
himself. Perhaps because he doesn’t want to remember. (Like in Wittgenstein: the deepest 
problems tend to be problems of will and willpower, not narrowly intellectual problems.)  
Our desire to compare ourselves with Leonard, both in terms of similarities and in 
terms of differences, is thus a desire that the film increasingly interrogates as well as 
stimulates.  
 
These films (and others like them: I’d make similar cases about Hiroshima mon 
amour, Last year in Marienbad, and other major Modernist film-texts25) could be viewed as 
forming a quasi-Wittgensteinian ‘argument’ against modelling and in favour of objects of 
comparison, with regard to cases in which modelling will crudify, reduce, and offer a false, 
cheap illusion of knowledge.  
 
These three (very different but all fundamentally Modernist in style, in narration) films 
offer various kinds of possible objects of comparison with Wittgenstein: with his narratorial 
style and voices, with his authorship, with his method(s), with his critiques of Cognitivism 
and Empiricism, with his work as a whole. And there are various elements of these films 
which work in this way: one can compare the films with each other, with Philosophical 
Investigations; one can compare characters in them with oneself, with Wittgenstein; and so 
forth. There is a rich vein to mine here, through which to think the benefits (as well as the 




Conclusion: Beyond Modernism 
                                                 
25 And I do make such a case, in my A film-philosophy of ecology and enlightenment, forthcoming with Routledge. 
 
 
 Wittgenstein seems to offer a theory to end all philosophical theories, in his early 
work. In his later work, he seems to offer — to hold out, tantalisingly, in 133; to seem to 
place a claim to — a discovery to end all philosophical discoveries. Both appearances are 
subtly, deliberately, seriously delusive. And necessarily so: any strategem that does not 
involve such ‘indirection’ as Wittgenstein does, working through one’s temptations to ‘end 
it all’, will tend to fall back into or indeed to be consumed by the very thing it actually seeks 
to criticise (including: the dangerous, essentialising tendency to make philosophy itself into 
one simple unified thing). If one wants to make it possible for philosophy to be written at 
all, after Kant and Nietzsche and Frege, one needs to avoid hoisting oneself on one’s own 
petard: and “…to end all…” -style thinking endlessly so self-hoists (as is patent in the self-
consuming fate of the Logical Positivists, for instance, who patently failed to understand 
Wittgenstein’s strategem, and were thus destroyed by their own Verification criterion). 
 Thus I have suggested that 133 involves at its heart a deliberate unreliability, a logical 
temptation.  
It’s notable that Wittgenstein in 91 warns against the tempting picture of a complete 
analysis of language. I think the ‘real discovery’, insofar as there is might be said to be any 
such thing at all as something more than a logical temptation, would include realizing that 
one can sometimes successfully address philosophical problems through the family of 
methods and approaches demonstrated in the Investigations. This vote of confidence might 
be called the ‘real discovery’ because it liberates us from the false ideal of (dependence 
upon) a ‘complete analysis’.  
 133 is itself putting forward a kind of object of comparison with which to reflect on 
philosophical practice. I want to allow that Wittgenstein’s development of his later 
approach is a real breakthrough that can take us past the see-sawing between dogmatic 
positions so characteristic of traditional philosophy - while not presenting it as self-
satisfiedly leaving behind or allegedly-definitively-overcoming the kinds of questions 
 
 
concerning our practice that we always need to leave room for, if we are not to end up 
producing a new jargon or a new beam in our eye. 
 Wittgenstein writes as he does not out of a faddish desire to make it new, but out of 
a profound need to plough over the field of language. His aim is to get the reader to do the 
kind of work that he himself was painfully doing: to seek to free himself from the endless 
pull of philosophical delusion and of premature self-satisfaction. Including, about 
philosophy itself and what we can hope for from it. 
 Thus Wittgenstein might helpfully be said to be in some respects a Modernist 
author. And in other respects beyond Modernism (or also, as I have noted, in certain 
respects anti-Modernist). But, thus understood, what lies beyond Modernism is nothing like 
Post-Modernism. It is, rather, a call to freedom (from prejudice, from dogmas) and to the 
intellectual virtues.  
 It is a much harder call to heed. And a much more weighty one. 
 
 
Envoi: beyond thought? 
A last thought. If you are in agreement with my critique of the standard ways of taking PI 
133, but unconvinced by my own reading of 133, my own way of casting of it as this 
radical move into and beyond modernism, then there is, it seems to me, one move still left 
open to you. And it may yet be a productive one.  
 If we think that there is anything left of the idea in 133 that there is a ‘therapeutic’ 
real discovery to be made that would put an end to the tormenting questions that 
philosophy catches itself in, then perhaps it is this: perhaps there is a sense in which 
Wittgenstein is inviting us to undertake a liberatory quest with some similarities to 
Buddhism (and, contemporarily, to that of Eckhart Tolle). Perhaps, that is, he is inviting us 
 
 
to wake up from the dream of thought. Perhaps no longer compulsively having to think at 
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